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Book/Printed Material The war for the fare how driver compensation affects bus system performance

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Title

  • The war for the fare how driver compensation affects bus system performance

Summary

  • "Two systems of bus driver compensation exist in Santiago, Chile. Most drivers are paid per passenger transported, while a second system compensates other drivers with a fixed wage. Compared with fixed-wage drivers, per-passenger drivers have incentives to engage in "La Guerra por el Boleto" ("The War for the Fare"), in which drivers change their driving patterns to compete for passengers. This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment provided by the coexistence of these two compensation schemes on similar routes in the same city. Using data on intervals between bus arrivals, we find that the fixed-wage contract leads to more bunching of buses, and hence longer average passenger wait times. The per-passenger drivers are assisted by a group of independent information intermediaries called "sapos" who earn their living by standing at bus stops, recording arrival times, and selling the information to subsequent drivers who drive past. We find that a typical bus passenger in Santiago waits roughly 10% longer for a bus on a fixed-wage route relative to an incentive-contract route. However, the incentives also lead drivers to drive noticeably more aggressively, causing approximately 67% more accidents per kilometer driven. Our results have implications for the design of incentives in public transportation systems"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Johnson, Ryan M.
  • Muñoz, Juan Carlos (Muñoz Abogabir)
  • Reiley, David H.
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2005.

Headings

  • -  Bus drivers--Chile--Santiago
  • -  Bus lines--Economic aspects--Chile--Santiago
  • -  Wages--Bus drivers--Chile--Santiago

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 11/30/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005399809

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Johnson, Ryan M, Juan Carlos Muñoz, David H Reiley, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. The War for the Fare How Driver Compensation Affects Bus System Performance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005399809/.

APA citation style:

Johnson, R. M., Muñoz, J. C., Reiley, D. H. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2005) The War for the Fare How Driver Compensation Affects Bus System Performance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005399809/.

MLA citation style:

Johnson, Ryan M, et al. The War for the Fare How Driver Compensation Affects Bus System Performance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <aj.sunback.homes/item/2005399809/>.