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Book/Printed Material The dynamics of seller reputation theory and evidence from eBay

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Title

  • The dynamics of seller reputation theory and evidence from eBay

Summary

  • "We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel data set of seller feedback histories and cross-sectional data on transaction prices collected from eBay is broadly consistent with all of these predictions. An important conclusion of our results is that eBay's reputation system gives way to strategic responses from both buyers and sellers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Cabral, Luis
  • Hortaçsu, Ali
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2004.

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/18/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005615751

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Cabral, Luis, Ali Hortaçsu, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. The dynamics of seller reputation theory and evidence from eBay. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. Pdf. https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005615751/.

APA citation style:

Cabral, L., Hortaçsu, A. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2004) The dynamics of seller reputation theory and evidence from eBay. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005615751/.

MLA citation style:

Cabral, Luis, Ali Hortaçsu, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. The dynamics of seller reputation theory and evidence from eBay. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <aj.sunback.homes/item/2005615751/>.