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Book/Printed Material Diversity and redistribution

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About this Item

Title

  • Diversity and redistribution

Summary

  • "This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible (in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive tax which is lumpsum rebated and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted) goods. We show that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests. When the degree of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers. As taste diversity increases in society, the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution. As diversity increases further, however, only general redistribution survives"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Fernandez, Raquel, 1959-
  • Levy, Gilat, 1970-
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2005.

Headings

  • -  Equality--Mathematical models
  • -  Income distribution--Mathematical models
  • -  Income tax--Mathematical models
  • -  Social classes--Economic aspects--Mathematical models
  • -  Wealth--Mathematical models

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/31/2005.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2005619183

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Fernandez, Raquel, Gilat Levy, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Diversity and Redistribution. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005619183/.

APA citation style:

Fernandez, R., Levy, G. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2005) Diversity and Redistribution. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2005619183/.

MLA citation style:

Fernandez, Raquel, Gilat Levy, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Diversity and Redistribution. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <aj.sunback.homes/item/2005619183/>.