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Book/Printed Material Preference signaling in matching markets

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Title

  • Preference signaling in matching markets

Summary

  • "Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

  • Coles, Peter (Peter A.)
  • Kushnir, Alexey
  • Niederle, Muriel
  • National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

  • Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2010.

Notes

  • -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/19/2010.
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Also available in print.
  • -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
  • -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

  • HB1

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2010656195

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Coles, Peter, Alexey Kushnir, Muriel Niederle, and National Bureau Of Economic Research. Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. Pdf. https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2010656195/.

APA citation style:

Coles, P., Kushnir, A., Niederle, M. & National Bureau Of Economic Research. (2010) Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2010656195/.

MLA citation style:

Coles, Peter, et al. Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <aj.sunback.homes/item/2010656195/>.