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Book/Printed Material Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot

About this Item

Title

  • Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot

Summary

  • Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction in counterinsurgency is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their existing core competencies or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies, which are not accustomed to working together, makes coordination difficult. And all this must take place in an environment where an armed, violent foe, who understands the disadvantage to him of a successful reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or destroy what has been accomplished. If the counterinsurgent understands what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute that plan, reconstruction can indeed then become one of the array of key weapons that do not shoot that are available to the counterinsurgent. Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well as the hunted. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to a manageable security environment and strong national institutions that have the confidence and the support of the people. But reconstruction that is mismanaged, bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent. -- Excerpted from pages xiii.

Names

  • Olson, Eric T. (Eric Thorne), 1950-
  • Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

Created / Published

  • Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2010]

Contents

  • Summary -- Introduction -- Reconstruction in times of war : a history -- The Marshall Plan -- Reconstruction in "small wars" : the U.S. experience in the Philippines -- A brief history of the writings about COIN and the role of reconstruction -- Reconstruction and the Vietnam War -- The legacy of Vietnam and "nation building" -- The impact of September 11, 2001 -- A doctrinal review -- The army operational concept -- Reconstruction and full spectrum operations --Full spectrum operations, COIN, and reconstruction -- Where the doctrine is strong -- Looming issues for the practitioner -- Conducting reconstruction in counterinsurgency : an exercise -- The scenario -- Observations -- Discussion of key tasks, priorities, and responsibilities -- Related conclusions -- A framework for reconstruction in counterinsurgency -- The framework : a concept for reconstruction -- Purpose of reconstruction -- Essential elements of reconstruction -- A scheme of reconstruction -- Responsibilities -- Assessment -- Organizing and managing the reconstruction effort -- Organizing the U.S. Government for reconstruction in COIN operations : the policy level -- Organizing the reconstruction effort in the COIN theater -- The level of execution -- Conclusion -- Enhancing army capabilities for reconstruction in counterinsurgency -- Preparation -- Reconstruction preparation of the battlefield -- Training -- Adding reconstruction capabilities to deploying army units -- Capabilities required -- Money as a weapons system -- Army capabilities to set conditions for the success of the civilian effort -- Reconstruction reconnaissance -- Direct assistance to humanitarian relief operations -- Systems to manage reconstruction in COIN : situational awareness -- Systems to manage reconstruction in COIN : decision support -- Tactics for combined reconstruction operations -- Provincial reconstruction teams -- Conclusions.

Headings

  • -  United States.--Army--Civic action
  • -  United States.--Army--Stability operations
  • -  Civil-military relations
  • -  Counterinsurgency
  • -  Integrated operations (Military science)
  • -  Interagency coordination--United States
  • -  Military doctrine--United States
  • -  Nation-building
  • -  Postwar reconstruction
  • -  DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
  • -  Elements of national power

Notes

  • -  "October 2010."
  • -  Includes bibliographical references.
  • -  Description based on print version record; resource not viewed.

Medium

  • 1 electronic resource (xiv, 139 pages )

Call Number/Physical Location

  • UH723
  • U413.A66

Digital Id

Library of Congress Control Number

  • 2023692712

Rights Advisory

  • This is non-restricted, fully open content that may be accessed on and off of the Library of Congress campus, with no restrictions, by an unlimited number of users

Access Advisory

  • Unrestricted online access

Online Format

  • image
  • pdf

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Cite This Item

Citations are generated automatically from bibliographic data as a convenience, and may not be complete or accurate.

Chicago citation style:

Olson, Eric T, and U.S.. Strategic Studies Institute Army War College. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010] Pdf. https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2023692712/.

APA citation style:

Olson, E. T. & Army War College, U. S. S. S. I. (2010) Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College] [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://aj.sunback.homes/item/2023692712/.

MLA citation style:

Olson, Eric T, and U.S.. Strategic Studies Institute Army War College. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot. [Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010] Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <aj.sunback.homes/item/2023692712/>.