Book/Printed Material Gender based taxation and the division of family chores

Title

• Gender based taxation and the division of family chores

Summary

• "Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. But in this paper we also explore differences in gender elasticities which emerge endogenously in a model in which spouses bargain over the allocation of home duties. GBT changes spouses implicit bargaining power and induces a more balanced allocation of house work and working opportunities between males and females. Because of decreasing returns to specialization in home and market work, social welfare improves by taxing conditional on gender. When income sharing within the family is substantial, both spouses may gain from GBT"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Names

• Alesina, Alberto
• Ichino, Andrea
• Karabarbounis, Loukas
• National Bureau of Economic Research

Created / Published

• Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, c2007.

Notes

• -  Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/12/2007.
• -  Includes bibliographical references.
• -  Also available in print.
• -  Mode of access: World Wide Web.
• -  System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Call Number/Physical Location

• HB1

Digital Id

• https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/gdcebookspublic.2007616758
• http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13638 External

Library of Congress Control Number

• 2007616758

Access Advisory

• Unrestricted online access

Online Format

• image
• pdf

LCCN Permalink

• https://lccn.loc.gov/2007616758

Additional Metadata Formats

• MARCXML Record
• MODS Record
• Dublin Core Record